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The role of morale, also known as esprit de corps, in a high technology envi-
ronment of the 21st century warfare, is poorly understood. The purpose of the 
study is to seek evidence for the proposition that the Ukraine’s population and 
military forces morale has neutralized the asymmetric difference in the mili-
tary force of the two countries. The academic and practical implications have 
the potential to refocus military practice. An exploratory qualitative research 
method using theoretical sampling was used in this study. The study finds 
significant evidence for high morale as a balancing factor in the asymmetric 
differences of Russia and Ukraine, which explains Ukraine’s success against 
greatly superior enemy. 
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1. Introduction and Literature Review 
Russia has overwhelming superiority in military strength, but Ukraine has 
fought Russia to a standstill in the Donbass region of Ukraine. In comparison, 
Russian’s military power dwarfs Ukraine’s military forces. Still, the Rus-
sia-Ukraine war in the Donbass has been going on for many years and is locked 
in a stalemate where the Russian and pro-Russian forces are unable to advance 
against the Ukrainian military forces. Regardless of the two Minsk Peace Agree-
ments, the war in the Ukraine Donbass is still ongoing after more than six years 
of conflict. Although main media coverage of the ongoing war is limited, serious 
fighting takes place on daily basis and this often involves heavy weapons as 
demonstrated by the quotes below from the situation updates given on Novem-
ber 26th 2019 by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(OSCE) monitors: “The security situation along the contact line in eastern 
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Ukraine has seriously deteriorated with the OSCE: SMM recorded over 1000 
ceasefire violations daily” (OSCE, 27/11, 2019). Even the Covid-19 pandemic did 
not appear to have stifled the fighting as OSCE Table of ceasefire violations as of 
17 May 2020 indicates. The Table covering the ceasefire violations on the 15th 
and 16th 2020 is 19 pages long (OSCE, 2020). 
This article explores morale: the esprit de corps, as a plausible explanation of 
how Ukraine was able to fight the Russian military and pro-Russia military 
forces to a standstill in the Donbass region of Ukraine.  
The significance of morale in military victory is recognized through history 
but, at present, the overwhelming focus on high technology weapon systems as 
source of victory on the battlefield results in a gap in the social science literature 
about the importance of morale in a 21st century military conflict. Certainly, ex-
pert application of the operational art is important and so are equipment and lo-
gistical support but, the Russian military and pro-Russian forces have the ad-
vantage in these areas. So, is the morale of the Ukrainian troops the mitigating 
factor leveling the asymmetric differences? If so, then the implications of morale 
for academic research and the practical importance in 21st century warfare merit 
more attention. Perhaps, General Marshall’s question in Men against Fire where 
he explores why “a tired, cold, muddy rifleman goes forward with the bitter 
dryness of fear in his mouth into the mortar bursts and machine-gun fire of a 
determined enemy” is as a relevant question in the 21st century as it was in 
WW2. 
Civilians and soldiers alike can overcome incredible obstacles and challenges 
against overwhelming odds with little more than an inexhaustible will to win. 
Military history is full of examples to this point: Alexander’s victory over the 
Persian army at Issus to Napoleon’s victory in the Battle of Austerlitz; to General 
O’Connor army of 38,000 defeating the better equipped Italian 10th Army, 
numbering 160,000 men; Israel’s defeat of Arab forces in the Six Day War; all are 
examples where an inexhaustible will to win carried the troops to victory.  
Moreover, Napoleon is to have said: “In war, three-quarters depends on mat-
ters of character and morale; the balance of manpower and equipment comes 
only for the remaining quarter” (Napoleon I, 27 August 1808). This will to win 
perplexed Clausewitz who wrote: “What this inexhaustible will to win is and 
where it comes from is a subject of great debate with an elusive answer” (Clau-
sewitz, 1997: p. 150; Clausewitz et al., 1984: p. 111, 127, 184). 
In the same vein, Ulio (1941) considers both military morale and civilian mo-
rale as critical elements of military success as they reinforce each other. Morale is 
the people’s commitment to a given cause of action and influences the level of 
hardship the soldiers and civilians alike are willing to suffer to win. However, he 
considers military morale different as it comes from the attitude the soldier has 
to the cause, his personal discipline, self-respect, pride in nation, army and 
group, group comradery, fundamental belief in justice and fair leadership. Addi-
tionally, Ulio (1941) considers the soldier’s personal welfare and recreational 
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mark that “An army marches on its stomach” is as true today as it was in the 
19th century.  
Contemporary scholars tend to focus on the cohesion theory to explain the 
ability of a national military to prevail for long periods regardless of asymmetries 
in military strength (Castillo, 2014). Others claim that the military training and 
battle drills are more important than the primary group thesis proposed by 
Morris Janowitz and Edward Shils in 1948 (King, 2016). However, more resent 
study done by Pawiński and Chami (2019) proposes a new model based on The 
Self-Determination Theory (Ryan & Deci, 2017) which focuses on the soldier’s 
competence, relatedness, and autonomy. Then how do we define this elusive will 
to win? Anderson (2010: p. 227) defines morale as “…the secret source of an 
enemy’s ability to sustain the activities of war” and the Royal Navy (2016) con-
siders morale as to its manifestation: “…it [morale] manifests itself in the will to 
win”. The fact that Ukrainian forces have valiantly fought pro-Russian and Rus-
sian forces in eastern Ukraine for more than six years indicates a will to win that 
is hard to ignore and contributes to the idea that at least a significant portion of 
the Ukrainian public has a fundamental believe in a Ukrainian identity and 
“self” as referred to by Feklyunia (2015). Hence, the following proposition is 
postulated: 
Proposition 1: The Ukrainian military and population have a greater will to 
win than that of Russia and the Russian backed separatist forces.  
There is a gap on the role of morale in the Ukraine Russia war in the literature 
and this article bridges this gap and seeks to explore the question of the impor-
tance of morale in the Russia-Ukraine war and suggests that morale has been the 
decisive factor in the defense of Ukraine. The study focuses on the Rus-
sia-Ukraine war but, the findings may be applicable to the explanation of victory 
in other wars where great military force asymmetry exists. The contribution of 
morale as a critical factor in Ukraine defense in the war with Russia has not been 
recognized in the literature on the war. Morale has functioned as force multiplier 
for Ukraine and distractor for Russia leveling the military force imbalance be-
tween the two countries. 
The next section provides the results of a search for evidence for the Ukraine’s 
military and civilian willingness to resist the Russian invasion and its implica-
tions are discussed. Then, the methods are described. Finally, a conclusion is 
drawn in support of the research proposition. 
2. Results 
The first part of this section provides evidence and discusses the Ukrainian mili-
tary and civilian willingness to resist the Russian invasion. The second part dis-
cusses the implications for the Russian and Ukrainian governments. 
Willingness to resist the Russian invasion 
In March 2014, the new Ukrainian government lacked legitimacy, it was not 
functioning effectively, the Ukrainian military was in disarray and large portion 
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the NATO Alliance were confused and lacked a response policy. So, had Russian 
military forces rolled up the road from Crimea to Kiev or come down from the 
north, little will, or military force was there to stop them. Later, the situation was 
different. There was an elected functional government, the military was reorga-
nized and reinforced. It is battle hardened and deployed for defense. The EU and 
the NATO Alliance have recognized the Russian threat and some policy analysis 
and response have been implemented such as the deployment of additional 
equipment to Poland. Most importantly, the Ukrainian population has suffered 
five years of economic hardship and the blame appears to be placed on Russia’s 
actions. 
The Ukrainian army is no pushover when it comes to the defense of the 
Ukrainian heartland. For more than five years, the army has been mobilizing 
and training men and many have gained battlefield experience in the Donbass 
war. In separate waves of mobilization, one hundred and ten thousand soldiers 
were recruited for the armed forces in 2014 and the another round of mobiliza-
tion added another 50,000 men as the Verkhovna Rada (Parliament) of Ukraine 
approved President Poroshenko’s decree “On Partial Mobilization” of January 
14th, 2015. The heroic defense of the Donbass by the Ukrainian Army was a 
complete surprise to President Putin and the pro-Russian aggressors. Especially, 
when one keeps in mind the drastic defense budget cuts and asset stripping of 
the Ukrainian army during the Yanukovych era. The easy defeat of the Ukraine 
forces in the Crimea lead the Russians to think the Donbass would be another 
easy victory. To their surprise the Ukraine Army was boosted by volunteer bri-
gades and public support and managed to stop the Pro-Russian attackers from 
advancing further into the Donbass region even with repeated heavy attacks that 
strong evidence suggest were supported by Russian Army units. The defense of 
the Donetsk airport by the Ukrainian Army’s “Cyborgs” from the 3rd Special 
Forces Regiment (Kirovohrad), 93rd Mechanised Brigade (Dnipropetrovsk re-
gion), 79th Airmobile Brigade (Mykolaiv), 17th Tank Brigade (Kryvyi Rih) and 
Pravy Sector volunteer battalion shattered any dreams of quick victory by the 
pro-Russian forces. The Cyborgs often faced overwhelming military forces but 
still fought a protracted battle for nearly a year (UT, 2016). 
As to the morale and determination of the Ukrainian people to resist tyranny, 
one can recall the determination of the unarmed people who stood on the Mai-
dan square for weeks, in minus 20 degrees weather, while being plummeted and 
bludgeoned by the Berkut paramilitary police. News media reports indicate that 
as many as 800 thousands people attended the demonstrations on Maidan 
Square but, this is an estimate (Whitmore, 2013). However, I belief this estimate 
is only of those in the square at any one time but does not account for the droves 
of people coming and leaving the demonstrations via the underground stations 
located near the Maidan Square. In the underground stations, one could observe 
constant stream of people carrying Ukrainian flags coming and leaving via the 
subway stations escalators. A great number of people came to the Maidan Square 
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demonstrations were parents with children, older folks and people on a break 
from work, still wearing their respective uniforms as nurses, doctors, priests, en-
listed men and officers etc. Historically, another indication of the Ukrainian 
people’s morale was demonstrated when it took the Soviet Army 5 years, from 
1944-59, to put down the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) in western Ukraine 
(Zhukov, 2007). Finally, a Gallup survey indicates 62% of Ukrainians are willing 
to fight for their country (Gallup, 2015). So the Russian Army will face deter-
mined defenders if it invades the Ukraine heartland. As the recent history of the 
fighting indicates, Ukraine has been fighting against the colossal Russian might 
for years and survived, which is a victory in and by itself. The morale of the 
Ukrainian people is reflected in President Poroshenko’s (2015) statement to the 
media: “…But our main strength is in the fact that we are fighting for the Truth 
and defending our native land. Thus, our power grows multiple times.” 
The defense of the strategically important Mariupol is a good example of how 
the determination to defend a Ukrainian city works. In August 2014 Mariupol 
residents rallied for the City’s defense and dug trenches and build fortifications 
(Olearchyk, 2014). While it was shortly under the control of the pro-Russian 
forces, Ukraine forces quickly recaptured Mariupol and have defended it against 
repeated attacks. The Ukrainian War Cabinet’s determination to defend the city 
was further demonstrated in statement on 13/7 2015: “As for Mariupol, the situ-
ation is exactly opposite, relevant measures are planned to be implemented to 
strengthen the defense of the city as well as the planned rotation of units…” 
(War Cabinet, 2015) and this is exactly what needs to be communicated to the 
Russian government: an absolute determination to defend Ukrainian territory. 
However, the picture is not all bright for the Ukraine army in terms of recruit 
and morale, as defections from post are common and the Ukrainian Parliament 
had to pass a law allowing officers to use deadly force on defectors. Nevertheless, 
as many as 16,000 soldiers are absent without leave and one half of draftees for 
the 6th army mobilization campaign may have dodged (Novorossia, 2015). The 
Russian Army has problems in this area too. Soldiers lack the motivation to fight 
in Ukraine and some have quit the Russian Army because of the pressure to vo-
lunteer for contract soldiering in Ukraine (Tsvetkova, 2015). 
Implications 
The implications for Russia are the need to avoid full scale military assault on 
Ukraine because the opportunity for an easy victory is lost and the civil and mil-
itary morale is high as demonstrated by six years of effort has resulted in a sta-
lemate. Perhaps, moving forward, one option for Russia is to continue its hybrid 
warfare with the objective to slowly drain Ukraine of resources and the will to 
fight resulting in the collapse of the pro-western governments. Another option 
for Russia is to take a page out of PLA’s notebook on the Sino-Vietnamese War 
in 1979 and declare a victory and go home. This option takes the pressure of 
Russia, is likely to result in the lifting of the sanctions imposed and the 
pro-western Ukraine governments may ultimately collapse on their own. Finally, 
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information- and cyber warfare and proxy pro-Russian military forces and that 
is seemingly what Russia has been doing. Berzins (2014) suggest that Russia has 
chosen these hybrid tactics but, it is not commonly understood that Russia uses 
these hybrid tactics because of a lack of conventional military resources and be-
cause of the high morale displayed by people and military of Ukraine. 
The implications for Ukraine are many. Ukrainian leaders need to make it 
crystal clear to the leaders in Moscow that Ukraine will use all available means to 
defend Ukraine sovereignty: including weapons of mass destruction and meas-
ure need to be taken to develop them, that Ukraine will be defended in depth, ci-
ties will be fortified like Mariupol, scorched earth orders will be issued for 
threatened territories and, that Ukraine will retaliate with attacks on targets in 
Russia. Moreover, the Ukraine government must defend against the informa-
tion, economic, and diplomatic warfare tactics Russia uses. The Russian infor-
mation warfare tactics needs to be explained to the Ukrainian public and meas-
ures need to be taken to combat it by electronic means and restriction on 
pro-Russian propaganda. However, economic reforms are a key to the continued 
public support for the defense of Ukraine from pro-Russian forces. People must 
have necessities and a hope of future economic prosperity. The full and rapid 
implementation of the Coalition Agreement by the Program of the Cabinet of 
Ministers and Strategy 2020 and the IMF-Ukraine Memorandum of Economic 
and Financial Policies are critical for the economic progress the public want and 
provide a basis for increased foreign investment leading to economic prosperity. 
The implications for the research are more focus needs to be given to the sig-
nificance of morale in modern warfare as this may be the plausible explanation 
for victory in other asymmetric wars in the 21st century such as the wars in Afg-
hanistan, Iraq and Yemen. 
The implications for political- and military practice is to focus on keeping the 
population and military morale at a high level both in their own countries and 
those of their allies.  
The implications for major military powers are to emphasize operations that 
attack the enemy’s fundamental will to fight and most likely by soft power tech-
niques and propaganda.  
3. Methodology 
This explorative study uses grounded research methodology to solve the imme-
diate problem of understanding the role of morale in international conflict in the 
21st century. Researchers consider exploratory research methodology appropri-
ate when generation of new explanations for a phenomenon is needed and the 
problem does not easily lend itself to hypothesis testing with quantitative me-
thods (Glaser & Strauss, 1967: p. 28; Roberts & Dunworth, 2012; Wright & 
Schartner, 2013). 
Theoretical sampling was used to collect data for evidence leading to the de-
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The role of morale was used to guide the collection of secondary information. 
Comparison of different data sources was used for reliability as endorsed by re-
searchers (Yin, 2013; Ferrier, 2001; Levy, 2008; Ghauri & Gronhaug, 2005: p. 
196).  
Literature review, open source articles, government reports, news reports and 
websites were used as sources of evidence for this article. Additional insight was 
developed by observation during frequent visits to Ukraine and discussions with 
eyewitnesses which also provided cross referencing of the secondary evidence as 
done by Mintzberg (1979). The author participated in security conferences, had 
discussions with academics in the security- and international relations fields and 
had informal discussion with serving and retired offices in the Armed Forces of 
Ukraine. Some researchers have recognized the advantage of such close connec-
tion with research subject as it enhances access and observation (Glaser & 
Strauss, 1967: p. 156; McFarland & Stansell, 1993). The exploratory qualitative 
case study methodology is widely accepted in the international relations and po-
litical science literature and most of the recent studies on the Ukraine-Russia 
conflict are indeed qualitative in nature as the phenomena do not lend itself rea-
dily to statistical or other Neo-Newtonian analysis.  
Suggestions for further studies include the research into the role of morale in 
the wars in Afghanistan and Yemen where useful lesson may be learned of how 
appealingly vastly inferior forces, at the least in technological and logistical 
terms, have gained ground against well equipped and supplied armed forces.  
4. Conclusion 
The high morale of the Ukrainian military and civilian population has multip-
lied the Ukrainian army’s defense power in the war with Russia. In comparison, 
the low morale of the Russian supported forces and military has neutralized 
Russia’s overwhelming military superiority over Ukraine making it unlikely that 
Russia has the military forces to invade Ukraine without seriously endangering 
the defense of Russian border areas. If Russia does take the risk of a full-scale 
military attack on Ukraine, then Russia that does not have the morale will be 
necessary to hold and control Ukraine. Therefore, a full-scale Russian invasion 
of Ukraine is not going to occur, and Russia must resort to alternative strategy 
and tactics to gain influence in Ukraine. 
The challenge for the Ukraine’s government is to maintain the support of the 
general population for the war and keep up the morale of the fighting forces and 
their commanders. Furthermore, the Ukraine’s government needs to increase 
the international pressure on Russia by lobbying the European Union and the 
United States for support and the maintenance of the sanctions imposed on 
Russia. 
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